Approved For Release 20 P/3 S PG-121-5100975A003700400001-6

16 June 1958

Copy No. 140

CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



DOCUMENT NO.

NO CHANGE IN CLASS.

I DECLASSIFIED

CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS SCO

NEXT REVIEW DATE: 70.2

AUTH HE TO-20 REVIEWER:

State Dept. review completed

TOP SECRET

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

	Approved Fo	Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003700400001-6		ZSA
	_			
νο 25¥1	Specia 14 June 199 Beirut may the city, ex the capabil The lo tempted co tinct possil A requ the near fu take the for	ture is possible. The call for intervention might rm of a request for Western intervention or for		25X1
25X1		xpanded UN observer corps, possibly a UNEF.	25X1	

				*
				#
	16 June 58	DAILY BRIEF ii		
				25X1

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Soviet Offer of Crude Oil May Be Accepted by Argentina

Argentina's consideration of a Soviet bid to supply approximately 7,266,000 barrels of crude oil during the next year, possibly under the 1953 trade agreement, is consistent with its bleak financial situation and stated policy of trying to obtain essential import requirements through increased trade. The Soviet offer to supply crude at \$1.78 a barrel FOB a Black Sea port was the lowest of eight in response to a recent Argentine Government call for bids, and the government may accept it, according to a credible report reaching the American Embassy in Buenos Aires.

The amount offered equals about 17 percent of Argentina's total imports of crude during 1957. Argentina imported a total of 1,244,000 barrels of Soviet crude during 1954 and 1955, when it had a large credit balance with the USSR resulting from sales of agricultural products. No Soviet crude has been imported since then. Venezuela and Kuwait have remained the main suppliers.

Growing consumption, which has exceeded the rate of increase in oil production, has aggravated Argentina's financial difficulties. Argentina's petroleum bill for 1957, some \$270,000,000, exceeded its total holdings of gold and foreign exchange, which at the end of April amounted to only \$250, -000,000.

Soviet supply of acceptable and reasonably-priced crude would heighten Argentine interest in increased trade with the USSR, which dropped from \$56,300,000 in 1955 to \$17, -200,000 in 1957. The twin factors of dollar shortages and difficulties in marketing exports are also leading Brazil and Uruguay to consider Soviet crude. The USSR recently offered to barter 1,450,000 barrels of crude for Brazilian coffee, cocoa, and cotton, and a trial shipment of Soviet oil arrived in Montevideo on 2 June.

25X1

25X1

16 June 58

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Page 1

25X1

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Cyprus

25X1

Demonstrations over Cyprus continue in both Turkey and Greece, although the island itself remains relatively quiet under strict curfew. An attempt by students in Athens to hold a meeting on 14 June, in defiance of a government ban, resulted in clashes with the police and several casualties.

25X1

Mass meetings continue throughout Turkey. A demonstration near Izmir announced for 15 June was probably primarily responsible for Greece's withdrawal of its personnel from the NATO base in that city on 14 June. Athens may have hoped to demonstrate its bitterness at alleged Turkish initiation of recent clashes in Cyprus. Greek personnel were previously withdrawn from Izmir following the anti-Greek riots of September 1955 and did not return until Turkey made efforts to compensate Greece for damages.

As usual in times of Greek-Turkish crisis, the Greek minority in Turkey is of special concern to Athens. Greek Foreign Minister Averoff has stated that Turkish violence against this minority would result in Athens' (1) severing diplomatic relations with Ankara, (2) taking retaliatory action against the Turkish minority in Greece, (3) possibly withdrawing from NATO, and (4) taking such other action as seems necessary.

Turkish and Greek rejection of the new British plan for Cyprus would make Britain's promised publication of the plan on 17 June anticlimactic. London, nevertheless, apparently intends to seek international support for the plan. It may hope, by emphasizing that the proposals are merely a basis for further negotiation, to obtain reconsideration by the parties directly concerned. Failing this, it may make a last-minute attempt to partition the island.

25X1

16 June 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2

25X1

25X1

Rejection of Britain's new plan, combined with the continued crisis on Cyprus and probably casualties among British security forces, will increase British public pressure on London to withdraw its forces to base enclaves. This public attitude, combined with Governor Foot's personal connections with Labor party leaders, makes it improbable that Labor will make Cyprus a partisan issue in the parliamentary debate following the 17 June announcement.

25X1

16 June 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt